The attacker locates the uploaded document ID in the SeedDMS data directory structure. They access the file directly via the browser or a command-line tool like curl : curl http://example.com Use code with caution.
| login | passwd (MD5) | |-----------|--------------------------------------| | admin | 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 (password) | | user1 | 7c6a180b36896a0a8c02787eeafb0e4c |
When any user (including the attacker) triggers the "Clear Cache" functionality, the injected command executes.
Once the attacker obtains admin credentials (hash cracked via John or Hashcat), they gain full access to the DMS. seeddms 5.1.22 exploit
Once inside, they examined the users table to extract password hashes. If cracking failed, they simply updated the admin password hash directly in the database:
I can provide the exact configuration rules needed to secure your specific deployment.
Implement a WAF to block requests that attempt to execute system commands through URL parameters (e.g., ?cmd= ). The attacker locates the uploaded document ID in
The attacker typically requires a valid user credential with write/upload permissions.
An authenticated user with "write" permissions could upload a malicious PHP script instead of a standard document.
They may change the Content-Type header to application/x-php or leave it as image/jpeg while keeping the .php extension to fool basic validation logic. 4. Locating the Path and Execution Once the attacker obtains admin credentials (hash cracked
| Vulnerability | Affected Component | Severity (CVSS) | Impact | |---------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------| | Cross‑Site Request Forgery (CSRF) | /op/op.Ajax.php , out.EditDocument.php , /op/op.LockDocument.php | 3.5 – 4.3 | Integrity compromise | | Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) | “Role management” menu, “Global Keywords” menu | 4.8 – 5.4 | Code execution | | Directory Traversal | “Log files management” menu | 6.5 | Arbitrary file deletion | | SQL Injection | Various components (pre‑5.1.25) | 6.1 – 7.2 | Data breach, RCE | | Weak Reset Token Generation | Password reset mechanism | 9.8 | Account takeover |
Directory traversal attacks leverage the use of ../ sequences in file paths to escape the intended directory. For example, an attacker might supply a filename value such as:
A malicious admin submits a request to delete a log file with a path containing ../ sequences: